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ESTATES AND TRUSTS
JOHN D. LAFLIN*

Four cases dealing with estates, trusts, and probate were decided
in the one-year Survey period considered for review. Two cases consider issues of recurring importance: no contest provisions and the
revocation and revival of wills. Two are limited to their facts and are
of little continuing importance. Because of the great impact of federal taxation in this area, this article also includes significant federal
tax decisions and rulings from the year under review.
I. NEW MEXICO DECISIONS

A. No Contest Provisions.
In re Estate of Seymour. 1 The decedent executed a will in 1971
while she was married. With the exception of a few minor bequests,
the will provided that her estate was to go to her husband if he survived her by 60 days or more. The alternate disposition provided that
her son would receive certain assets and that the residue would go to
her stepson. The will also provided that if either her son or stepson
made a claim that he was entitled to a greater share of the estate, or
in any way contested any of the terms of the will, he would be disinherited.
The decedent and her husband were divorced in 1975. The decedent died in March of 1977. The will was submitted for probate. Its
admissibility was contested by the decedent's son. The son argued
that his mother's will was partially revoked by operation of law as a
result of her divorce and, since the statute in effect on the date of
the divorce did not prescribe an alternative disposition of the estate,
it should be distributed pursuant to the laws of intestacy. The district court admitted the will to probate and found that because the
son had contested the will's provisions, he should be disinherited pursuant to the "no contest" provision of the will.
The court of appeals reversed the district court.' The supreme
court granted certiorari and reversed in part and affirmed in part the
*John D. Laflin & Associates, P.A., Albuquerque, New Mexico.
1. 93 N.M. 328, 600 P.2d 274 (1979).
2. Id. at 329, 600 P.2d at 275.
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decision of the court of appeals.' At issue before the court were two
questions of first impression in New Mexico: (1) whether a will should
be construed in accordance with the Uniform Probate Code, effective
on July 1, 1976, or with the law as it existed on the date of the divorce; and (2) whether a will's no contest provision is valid and enforceable.
The statute in effect on the date of the divorce' provided that a
divorce revokes all provisions in a will for the testator's divorced
spouse. The statutory section, however, was silent as to the manner
of disposition of the revoked portion of the testator's estate. The
Uniform Probate Code' provides for a similar revocation, but in addition provides that the property prevented from passing to such a
former spouse by divorce "passes as if the former spouse failed to
survive the decedent." 6 The supreme court reversed the court of appeals on this issue and held that the effect of the divorce should be
determined under the new probate code. The decedent died after the
new probate code became effective-the date of death, rather than
the date of divorce, controls which law applies. 7
The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' decision that the
son should not be precluded from sharing in his mother's estate because of the will contest. The court adopted the view, held by most
jurisdictions, that no contest provisions are valid and enforceable,
but are not effective to disinherit a beneficiary who has contested
the will in good faith and with probable cause to believe that the will
was invalid.8
B. Revival of Revoked Will.
In re Will of Greig.9 The decedent executed a will in 1972. In
1975, she executed a second will. Each will was validly executed and
effective at the time it was signed. Sometime between 1972 and 1976
the first two pages of the 1972 will were torn. In 1976, the decedent
executed a document entitled "Affirmation of Last Will and Testament" declaring her 1972 will to be her last will and testament.
It was contended that because the 1972 will had been revoked by
3. Id.
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-7.1(B) (Supp. 1975) (repealed 1975).
5. N.M. Stat Ann. § § 45-1-101 to -7-401 (1978). The Uniform Probate Code was in
effect on the date of the decedent's death.
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-508 (1978).
7. 93 N.M. at 331, 600 P.2d at 278.
8. Id. at 332, 600P.2d at 278.
9. 92 N.M. 561, 591 P.2d 1158 (1979).
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tearing,"0 it could not be revived.' ' The supreme court found that
section 45-2-507, by its terms, requires that, to be revoked by tearing, a will must be torn with the intent to revoke.' 2 Because there
was no evidence to support a finding that the 1972 will had been
torn by the decedent with this intent, the 1976 revival was effective
to revoke the 1975 will and the 1972 will was admitted to probate.
C. Enforcement of Decedent'sNote to HimselfAgainst the
Community.
In re Estate of Shadden. 1 3 The decedent left a will bequeathing
certain items of his separate property to his son. One of the items was
a promissory note "payable to me from the community in the amount
of $9,000.00 which represents money I received from some of my
personal property."' ' The note was executed by the decedent only,
although on its face it purported to bind both the decedent and his
wife.
The decedent's son filed a claim against the estate for the payment
of the promissory note. The claim was disallowed by the estate but,
following a hearing, the district court entered judgment for $9,000.00
for the son against the estate. The court of appeals affirmed the district court in part.
The central issue before the court was the validity and enforceability of the promissory note against the community property of the
decedent and his surviving spouse. Evidence had been admitted in the
district court that supported a finding that the decedent had contributed $9,000.00 of his separate property to the community, that he
considered the contribution to be a debt from the community to him,
and that he intended the note to be a preferential charge against his
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-507 (1978) provides:
A will or any part thereof is revoked by:
B. a subsequent will which revokes the prior will or part thereof, expressly or
by inconsistency; or
C. being burned, torn, cancelled, obliterated or destroyed, with the intent and
for the purpose of revoking it by the testator or by another person in his
presence and by his direction.
11. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-509 (1978) provides that "[i]
fa person having made a will,
makes a subsequent will, revoking the prior will, and afterwards revokes the subsequent will,
the prior will is not thereby made valid, unless the validity of the prior will is acknowledged
in writing."
12. 92 N.M. at 563, 591 P.2d at 1160.
13. 93 N.M. 274, 599 P.2d 1071 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 172, 598 P.2d 215
(1979).
14. 93 N.M. at 276, 599 P.2d at 1073.
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estate. The court of appeals held that the note created a valid and
binding obligation that could be satisfied out of the decedent's separate property and his share of the community personal property, but
declined to hold that community real property could be committed
to the repayment of the note.' s
The court noted an apparent conflict between the intent of the
testator and sections 45-2-8041 6 and 40-3-13' ' of the New Mexico
statutes. In resolving this conflict, the court of appeals held that, pursuant to section 45-2-804, the entire community is subject to claims
of third parties who dealt in good faith with the community during
its existence, but that this section did not extend to claims arising as a
result of a note between a member of the community and himself.1 8
The court further held that the claim should be satisfied out of the
decedent's separate and community personal property in the manner
prescribed by section 45-3-902.1 '
D. Oral Antenuptial Agreements.
In re Estate of Lord. 20 The supreme court held that an alleged
oral antenuptial agreement in which decedent agreed to devise her
entire estate to Lord if he would marry her "and take care of her like
a husband would" was void as against public policy. 2 The suit arose
when decedent's sister sought formal probate of decedent's will. Decedent's husband objected to the formal probate, contending that
the oral antenuptial agreement should be specifically enforced. On
certiorari, the supreme court held that the oral antenuptial agreement, irrespective of any evidence based on it, was invalid as a matter
of law and unenforceable. The supreme court held that it is the policy of this state to foster and protect the marriage institution and not
to encourage spouses to marry for money. 2
Under the statute of frauds, the court could have excluded evidence
of the antenuptial agreement because it was oral. In using the public
policy rationale instead, the supreme court chose to affirm a broader
principle.
15. Id. at 280-81, 599 P.2d at 1077-78.
16. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-804 (1978). This section provides that "[u] pon the death of
either spouse, the entire community property is subject to the payment of community
debts."
17. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-13 (1978). This section provides in part that the community
real property cannot be encumbered without the joinder of both spouses.
18. 93 N.M. at 281, 599 P.2dat 1078.
19. Id. at 282, 599 P.2d at 1079. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-3-902 (1978) provides for the
order of abatement of shares of distributees.
20. 93 N.M. 543, 602 P.2d 1030(1979).
21. Id. at 544, 602 P.2d at 1031.
22. Id.
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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL TAXATION
A. Taxation of Trust Gains.
In Letter Ruling 7903021, the Internal Revenue Service stated
that, pursuant to the provisions of section 644 of the Internal Revenue Code, gains from the sale of trust property that is a capital asset
in the hands of the trust, where the trust is created after May 21,
1976, will be taxed at the grantor's ordinary income rates when the
asset is an ordinary asset to the grantor.2 3
B. Carry-OverBasis Repealed.
Carry-over basis, which was introduced into the law in 1976 and
postponed by the Revenue Act of 1978, was repealed as part of the
Windfall Profits Tax.2 4 The stepped-up basis rules of section 101425
have been reinstated.
C. Unified Credit.
Revenue Ruling 79-398 holds that the use of the unified credit for
estate and gift taxation is mandatory rather than permissive as was
regard to the use of the pre-1977 $30,000 gift tax exthe case 2with
6
emption.
D. RetainedPower to Change Corporate Trustee.
Revenue Ruling 79-353 holds that if a grantor retains the power to
remove a corporate trustee without cause and substitute another corporate trustee, the powers of the corporate trustee will be imputed to
the grantor.2 Thus, if the corporate trustee has the discretionary
power to distribute income or principal which is not limited by the
ascertainable standards of section 2041, the trust property is includable in the estate of the grantor.2 S
Revenue Ruling 79-353 has been criticized as not being supported
29
by the authorities relied upon by the Internal Revenue Service.
Until this issue is resolved, it will be wise to limit all discretionary distributions of principal from a trust to the ascertainable standards of
health, education, support, or maintenance as set forth in section
23. I.R.S. Letter Ruling Rep. (CCH), Letter Ruling No. 7903021 (Sept. 29, 1978).
24. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401(a), 94 Stat.
229.
25. I.R.C. § 1014.
26. Rev. RuL 79-398, 1979-2 C.B. 338.
27. Rev. RuL 79-353, 1979-2 C.B. 325.
28. I.R.C. § § 2036(a)(2), 2038.
29. See Mertens Law of Federal Income-Current Tax Highlights 1-2 (VoL 21, No. 17
Dec. 20, 1979); [1980 Master Binder] Tax Mngm't Mem. (BNA) 3-7 (Feb. 11, 1980).
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2041." In the alternative, the grantor could forego the power to
change corporate trustees.
E. Assignment of Term Insurance.
In November, 1979, the Internal Revenue Service issued Letter
Ruling 8006109, stating that the annual gift tax exclusion ($3,000)
is available for premiums paid by an employer on a group term insurance policy where the employee-insured has assigned the policy to an
irrevocable trust.' ' The ruling required, however, that the irrevocable
trust contain the so-called Crummey clause,3 2 which grants to the
trust beneficiary the right of withdrawal for a limited time. The
problem is how premium payments made by an employer on term insurance could be withdrawn. Must the beneficiary be granted the
right to withdraw the insurance policy itself'? The answer may be to
give or loan funds to the trust so that there is sufficient cash available
for withdrawal under the Crumm-ey clause, since the employer does
not give the trustee any funds, but pays the premiums directly to the
insurance company.
F. Disclaimer of Jointly Held Property.
The Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that property
held in joint tenancy cannot be disclaimed by the surviving joint tenant unless the disclaimer is made within a reasonable time after the
creation of the joint tenancy, rather than within nine months after
death. 3 Letter Ruling 7829008 concerned the case of a husband
and wife in Arizona, a community property state. Thus, the problems
of joint tenancy by spouses in New Mexico include not only the problems of loss of stepped-up basis on the surviving spouse's community
interest and the possible double taxation of decedent spouse's onehalf community interest when surviving spouse dies, but also the possible loss of the estate tax advantage otherwise available under state
and federal disclaimer statutes.
G. Special Valuation.
As part of the 1976 Tax Reform Act, Congress passed section
2032A, permitting the valuation of certain farm and closely held
business property for estate tax purposes at its economic value rather
30.
31.
32.
33.

I.I.C. § 2041.
I.R.S. Letter Ruling Rep. (CCH), Letter Ruling No. 8006109 (Nov. 20, 1979).
Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
I.R.S. Letter Ruling Rep. (CCH), Letter Ruling No. 7829008 (Apr. 14, 1978).
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than fair market value. 3 4 The maximum reduction in value under the
law is $500,000.00. S
Section 2032A(e)(10) was added by the Revenue Act of 1978 to
allow the inclusion of the entire community to ascertain if the required conditions of section 2032A are met. The 1978 amendment,
the maximum
sub-paragraph (e)(10), could be construed as limiting
36
benefit to $500,000.00 for the entire community.

34. I.R.C. § 2032A.
35. Id. § 2032A(a)(2).
36. See I.R.S. Letter Ruling Rep. (CCH), Letter Ruling No. 8023027 (Mar. 7, 1980).

